Holistic Biology: What It Is And Why It Matters by Watts, F & Reiss, MJ
Holistic Biology: What it is and Why it Matters 
 
Fraser Watts and Michael Reiss 
Introduction 
 
The basic idea behind the series of articles in this special issue can be stated 
relatively simply. There are a number of features of biology that are problematic 
for those who are wary of the project of trying to reduce everything in biology to 
physics. For such people, biology has become over-mechanistic, over-
deterministic, over-reductionist, and associated with the presumption that it 
cannot be reconciled with theistic views. 
 
However, in recent years, there have been developments in biology that 
seem to weaken the grip of such a deterministic, reductionist, mechanistic 
approach. These approaches to biology can be called, holistic, organismal or 
systemic. In as far as they make biology less mechanistic, deterministic or 
reductionist, they can be regarded as welcome scientific developments for many 
who hold religious views (though that doesn’t apply to all who hold religious 
views, nor only to religious people).  
 
We do not intend to suggest that there is anything radically new about 
these developments. To some extent, they represent a recovery of older 
traditions in biology that were for a time largely eclipsed by the conspicuous 
success of molecular biology. In part the present return to a more holistic biology 
is just a turning of the tide, and the fact that it is sometimes presented as 
radically new arises in no small part from the rhetorical need to present biology 
as doing something new in order to garner funding, and similar extrinsic 
reasons. Most significantly, there are new empirical as well as conceptual 
developments that are increasingly driving a more holistic way of doing biology. 
The history of holistic biology is the focus of the next article in this special issue, 
by Michael Ruse. 
 
It is difficult to even state the simple idea of the opening paragraph (i.e. 
that there are significant philosophical and religious advantages in holistic 
biology), without starting upon the numerous caveats and qualifications that 
need to be entered. In this introductory article we will indicate some of these 
complexities, and then assess what remains of the simple idea of the above 
paragraph. To anticipate, we will argue that something significant remains, 
though it is more subtle and nuanced than might originally be supposed. 
 
One problem that is already apparent is that it is hard to know what are 
the best terms to use. We have mentioned three possible ways of indicating what 
may be problematic in biology from a religious point of view (i.e. deterministic, 
reductionist, mechanistic) and we have also used three different terms for the 
recent trends in biology that seem to counteract those problematic features 
(holistic, organismal and systems biology). There are common features in these 
approaches to biology, but also significant differences, and we will need to clarify 
the issues that arise about these different modes of biology. However, we will 
first probe what is meant by determinist, reductionist and mechanistic biology. 
 
 
Concerns about Biological Theorizing 
 
We will now consider features of biological theorizing that have caused concern 
in some religious and philosophical circles, i.e. that biology is too mechanistic, 
determinist or reductionist. Our general line in each case will be that there are 
strong forms that are potentially problematic, but that there are weaker and 
more nuanced forms that are not. The value of holistic biology is that it leads 
towards these more nuanced forms. There have been several philosophical 
efforts to resolve the tension between reductionism/determinism/mechanistic 
thinking and the religious worldview. The attraction of holistic biology is that it 
helps to deal with this problem from within science. 
 
 
 
 Determinism 
 
The first point to be made about determinism is that it is a background 
philosophical assumption rather than a conclusion from scientific inquiry. 
Science has not proved determinism to be correct; it simply assumes it. Some 
might claim that science necessarily presupposes determinism, and could not 
proceed on any other basis. However, that is not obviously correct, and reflects a 
rather dated view of science. Isaac Newton, for example, was not a determinist in 
any obvious sense (at least not a naturalistic determinist); for example, he 
allowed for God acting outside the causal pathways studied by natural science to 
adjust the planetary motions. However, his lack of deterministic assumptions did 
not prove a barrier to his conducting scientific inquiry and making, to understate 
the point, major contributions to scientific understanding. 
 
What science does presuppose is a degree of predictability, or lawfulness, 
in the phenomena it is studying. There is no theological problem with that 
assumption. Indeed, it has sometimes been argued, with some plausibility, that 
Christian theology implies a degree of predictability, and furthermore that is one 
of the key reasons why science has flourished in Christian civilization. However, 
determinism goes further than assuming a degree of predictability, and assumes 
that all phenomena are completely predictable from their causal antecedents, 
and that complete explanations can be offered for them. 
 
Complete explanations and exact predictions are relatively rare in 
biology, at least at the macroscopic level. Most biological processes are affected, 
directly or indirectly, by such a complex network of causal factors that exact 
predictions are impossible. Biological predictions tend to be probabilistic rather 
than exact. Indeed that may one of the key differences between the physical and 
life sciences, though it is only a difference of degree, as exact predictions can be 
found in biology (e.g. all organisms die), and probabilistic ones in the physical 
sciences (e.g. radioactivity, the Uncertainty Principe). Physicists might say that 
biological systems are mostly chaotic, though that is not language that is widely 
used in biology.  
 
It is hard to settle the question of whether or not formally chaotic 
systems, i.e. systems that are too complex to be predictable, are still 
deterministic. The lack of predictability creates an epistemological barrier to 
settling the matter. Some argue, as John Polkinghorne does, that it is a 
reasonable conjecture that systems that are not predictable are also not 
deterministic (see Saunders, 2002). Others point to the fact that systems 
modeled by deterministic mathematics can actually be chaotic and 
unpredictable. We suggest that neither position settles the matter conclusively. 
How systems are modeled doesn’t finally settle how they actually operate. There 
is a gap between the underlying reality (ontology) and our understanding of it 
(epistemology) that may not be bridgeable; indeed, the two may not necessarily 
be aligned. 
 
However, what can be said with confidence is that exhaustive mono-
causal accounts are rare in biology. Most systems with consequences for 
macrobiology are influenced by such a wide range of factors that exact 
prediction is rarely possible. Genetic determinism has been one of the most 
pervasive forms of mono-causal determinism to be proposed in modern biology. 
However, as every geneticist knows, the genotype interacts with a wide range of 
factors to reach the phenotype; and in most cases the pathways by which genes 
exercise their effects are incompletely known. Even if and when we do possess 
such knowledge, this does not mean that determinism will reign. 
 
Issues to do with genetic causation take us to the significance for holism 
of epigenetics, broadly understood. At the heart of epigenetics is the recognition 
that genes interact with other factors. Indeed one of the key forms of interaction 
is that contextual factors switch genes on or off. This is more than saying that 
they exercise their effects through complex pathways in which they interact with 
other factors; it is saying that whether they even begin to have effects at all is 
influenced by contextual factors. 
 For present purposes we propose to set aside general issues about 
determinism in biology and to focus on mono-causal determinism. There is an 
obvious convergence between the striking absence of mono-causal determinism 
in macrobiology and the assumptions of holistic and systems biology. For most 
purposes it is possible to remain agnostic about whether or not biological 
systems are actually deterministic, or just too complex to predict.  
 
Reductionism  
 
Turning to reductionism, it is important to distinguish between problematic and 
unproblematic forms of reductionism. Almost everyone recognizes the need to 
make some such distinction. Daniel Dennett (1995), for example, makes a 
distinction between good and greedy reductionism; in the latter, people 
“underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or levels of theory 
in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the foundation” (82). 
The behaviorism of B. F. Skinner is one of his main examples of greedy 
reductionism. 
 
Though almost everyone recognizes that some reductionisms are greedy, 
there are probably different views about how ubiquitous this is. Because holistic 
biology emphasizes the complexity of biological systems, they are likely to be 
highly sensitive to the tendency of greedy reductionism to underestimate the 
complexities. So, from the perspective of holistic biology, a lot of reductionism 
may look greedy. However, this doesn’t rule out the possibility that holistic 
biology may still be reductionist in a more helpful sense of reductionism. 
 
One important issue here is whether or not an explanation is complete. It 
is only when we have complete explanations that the reduction can be used to 
justify elimination. Without complete explanation, reduction cannot be justified. 
Given how rare complete explanation is in biology, elimination also ought to be 
very rare. However, there is a disturbing tendency to assume, usually on 
ideological grounds, that complete explanations will be possible in the end, even 
though they have not yet actually been achieved, and to proceed to elimination 
on account, as it were, in anticipation of the complete explanations that are 
anticipated. 
 
The best known example of this is in neuroscience, where Patricia 
Churchland (1986) has been an enthusiastic advocate of the elimination of folk 
psychology, or mentalese, on the basis of the anticipated complete explanation of 
mentalese to neuroscience. It doesn’t hold her back that we don’t yet have that 
complete explanation; she assumes it will eventually be achieved, and proceeds 
on that basis.   
 
In fact there has been a growing recognition that fully-fledged inter-
theoretic reduction is seldom achievable. Gregory Bock and Jamie Goode (1998) 
concluded, after a review, that there were only two cases where it was widely 
accepted by experts in the field that reduction from biology to chemistry was 
possible, the bacteriorhodopsin receptor and muscle contraction. However (and 
we accept, of course, that the number of cases rises over time as knowledge 
accumulates), this has not led to the abandonment of reductionism in biology, 
but to a refinement of what form it should take, sometimes known as neo-
reductionism (Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
One of the key issues here is that reductionism seems to assume that all 
causal processes are ones in which the parts influence the whole. Unlike holistic 
biology, it does not recognize that the whole can also influence the parts. That 
raises the question of whether holistic assumptions are compatible with any 
kind of reductionism, which in turn depends on the scope of what is included in 
reductionism. Neo-reductionism rejects the possibility of top-down causation 
and assumes that causation is entirely bottom-up (Rosenberg, 2007). It assumes 
that people operate rather like automata such as The Writer, built in the 1770s, 
in which the writing is driven entirely by bottom-up mechanical causation. Such 
exclusively one-way reductionism is not compatible with holistic assumptions.  
 
However, if you allow for two-way reductionism, there is more scope for 
reconciliation between reductionism and holism. One of the main advocates of 
two-way reductionism in the human sciences has been Michael Arbib (1985). 
Two-way reductionism may seem a radical extension of the concept of 
reductionism but, if the assumptions of holistic biology are correct, it is a 
necessary extension. Holism leads either to the conclusion that reductionism 
should be abandoned, except for certain simple cases, or to the view that it 
should be broadened to include two-way reductionism.  
 
Though top-down and bottom-up is the most widely-used terminology, it 
is not entirely satisfactory, as the assumptions about levels that it embodies are 
controversial. After many years of using the concept of top-down causation in 
discussing topics on the interface of theology and science such as divine action, 
Arthur Peacocke (1999) eventually abandoned top-down terminology and spoke 
instead about whole-part constraint. This is clearer terminology that arises 
directly from holistic assumptions. Following Peacocke’s lead, rather than talking 
about top-down causation, we would rather say that whatever reductionism is 
adopted should allow for the influence of wholes upon parts. 
 
However, it needs to be noted that there is an ambiguity about what 
counts as the whole. It would be unwieldy to operate with the largest possible 
whole and, in any case, it would be hard to know what ought to be included in 
that. For all practical purposes, biology needs to operate with sub-wholes, to 
make the task of understanding the relation between parts and wholes 
manageable. The decision about what wholes to select is a pragmatic one, 
influenced by the objectives of a particular scientific inquiry. 
 
Mechanism 
 
The issues raised by mechanism in biology are also complex. As with 
reductionism there are issues about how broadly mechanism is to be defined. It 
might be argued, from a holistic perspective, that mechanistic explanations 
cannot possibly be adequate in biology. Objections have also been raised on 
theological (Mackay, 1965) and philosophical (Polanyi, 1968) grounds to 
mechanistic models, especially for humans. However, much depends on what is 
meant by biological mechanisms. 
 
On the face of things it is puzzling there have been two concurrent 
developments in 21st century biology. One has been the widespread enthusiasm 
for systems biology which, as we will see, has been said to be holistic; the other 
has been a new focus on biological mechanisms (e.g. Craver and Darden, 2013). 
At first sight, these trends might seem contradictory, and that has led to a 
discussion about the role of explanatory mechanisms in systems biology (e.g. 
Mekios, 2015). The general response to this challenge has been to increase the 
scope and sophistication of explanatory mechanisms, so that they capture the 
complexity of biological processes more adequately. 
 
Though it is standard practice among empirical biologists to try to 
formulate the mechanisms by which particular processes come about, we 
suggest that by mechanisms they usually just mean detailed explanatory models, 
and that biological mechanisms need not be machine-like. A good deal of 
confusion has been caused by a misunderstanding of what is meant by 
mechanism, but there seems a reasonable consensus that biological mechanisms 
need not be, and probably should not be, seen as machines. Rom Harré (1972) 
suggests that mechanism has two quite distinct meanings: one is a “mechanical 
contrivance”, the other is “any kind of connection through which causes are 
effective” (118). Mechanisms in science, he suggests, are the latter but not the 
former.  
 
Carl Carver and Lindley Darden (2013) are equally forthright in saying 
that “biological mechanisms are often quite unlike machines” in the sense of 
being “contrivances, with pre-existing, organised and interconnected parts” such 
as clocks, pumps, internal combustion engines or computers (15). Biological 
mechanisms are “tinkered together under mutual constraints through evolution 
by natural selection” and “their parts may be synthesized on the fly” (15). The 
result is that the “blueprint for the typical biological mechanism is decidedly 
messier than the blueprint for even complicated machines” (15).  
 
However, even after clarifying that biological mechanisms are not 
machine-like, there are questions about how far the search for mechanisms can 
take systems biology or other more holistic approaches to biology. Constantinos 
Mekios (2015), for example, accepts that mechanisms can provide useful 
explanations in systems biology, but questions how far the search for 
mechanisms is able to carry through “the comprehensive explanatory integration 
demanded for the holistic understanding of complex biological systems” (47). In 
practice, however, biology generally tries to formulate what we might term fine-
grained mechanisms that elucidate quite specific processes. The search for a 
mechanism often starts with an observable linkage between A and B. The search 
for the relevant mechanism is the search for a causal explanation of the linkage. 
 
There are normally no constraints on the complexity of what is allowed as 
a mechanism. Mechanisms can be holistic in the sense that wholes can influence 
parts, we well as vice-versa. The operation of mechanisms can be determined by 
the environmental context of the organism. Mechanisms can be formulated in a 
way that explicitly adopts the assumptions about mutual interaction that are 
prevalent in systems biology, and there is no necessary conflict between systems 
biology and the search for mechanisms in the general sense of detailed causal 
models (Braillard and Malaterre, 2015).  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the mechanisms that scientists 
propose are models. Modeling is at the heart of the scientific processes, and all 
models unavoidably draw on broad metaphors, i.e. a likeness is assumed 
between the actual biological process and the model, but models are not 
themselves exact descriptions. Even if mechanistic models represent biological 
processes adequately for predictive purposes, that does not demonstrate that the 
biological process actually is machine-like, only that it can be modeled 
mechanistically. It seems likely that systemic mechanisms are likely to be seen as 
less and less machine-like as they try to model the feedback-rich interactional 
complexity of biological processes. 
 
Michael Ruse (2010) sees mechanism and organicism as having been the 
two dominant metaphors in western science. Historically, they have been 
regarded as alternatives. However, as holistic biology tries to understand the 
non-machinelike mechanisms that underpin holistic processes in biology, it may 
be that we are moving towards a hybrid that integrates features of both 
traditions. It is perhaps too soon to judge whether such a hybrid is possible, or 
whether the attempt to reconcile mechanism and organicism is fundamentally 
incoherent. The current search for so-called mechanisms that are explicitly not 
machine-like could be taken as a worrying pointer to how people are currently 
trying to maintain incompatible assumptions side-by-side. On the other hand, 
resolving this may just call for the kind of clarification of what is meant by 
mechanism in biology that we have set out here. 
 
Summary 
 
With each of the three topics we have considered in this section we have 
distinguished broad and narrow meanings of the terms concerned. In each case 
we suggest that legitimate concerns can arise when terms are used in a narrow 
way, but not when they are used more broadly. Specifically, there are potential 
concerns about mono-causal determinism, but fewer about multi-causal 
determinism; there are also potential concerns about reductions that are uni-
directional and exclusively bottom-up, but fewer about reductions that allow for 
top-down or whole-part influences. Finally, there are concerns about the search 
for biological mechanisms if it is assumed that they are like machines, but not if 
mechanism just means a detailed explanatory model that sets out how causes 
achieve their effects. 
 
Holistic Modes of Biology 
 
Holism in biology has an identifiable origin in J. C. Smuts Holism and Evolution 
(Smuts, 1926), which proposed that systems should be viewed as wholes not just 
as collections of parts. This is basically an ontological proposal, i.e. that the 
universe fundamentally consists of a set of wholes rather than a set of parts. 
However, in weaker versions, it is just a causal or explanatory proposal, i.e. that 
parts are to be explained to some degree in terms of the action of wholes on 
them, and that causal processes are not exhausted by considering how parts 
affect wholes. We will not duplicate here Michael Ruse’s fuller exploration of the 
holistic tradition in biology in the next article in this special issue, but will 
explore how far organicist biology and systems biology are holistic. 
 
Organicism 
 
In clarifying the distinction between holism and organicism, it will be helpful to 
anticipate here the formulation set out by Michael Ruse in the next article. He 
suggests that a holist is someone who sees everything as interconnected and that 
things make sense only if parts are considered in relation to wholes. An 
organicist, in contrast, is someone who sees the organic model, i.e. one based on 
life, as the basic or root metaphor in science. 
 
It may help to clarify the relationship between holistic and organicist 
biology to make use of the classic distinction between denotation and 
connotation. We suggest that the kinds of biology that can be identified as 
holistic and organismal are largely the same. To put it another way, you can’t find 
a kind of biology that is holistic but not organismic, or vice versa. Nevertheless, 
these terms have different histories, come from different metaphysical 
backgrounds, and have different connotations. They may refer to the same 
biologies, but their sense, as Gottlob Frege would have said, is quite different. 
Different authors in this special issue focus mainly on different terms.  
 
Organismal biology has rather different origins from holistic biology. In 
part the organismal approach is just a preference for studying biological 
structure and function in whole organisms. The equivalent in medicine is whole-
person medicine. However, organicism also depends on a distinctive set of 
metaphors or models for scientific inquiry. As Michael Ruse (2010) has 
discussed, it is the main source of non-mechanistic explanatory models in 
science.  
 
Organicism can be applied to any area of science. It is possible to argue, as 
Lovelock has done in his Gaia hypothesis (Ruse, 2013) that the biosphere should 
be thought of as a living system. In stark contrast, it is possible to use the kind of 
mechanistic models that come from physics to understand living systems. 
However, if organicism is to find an accepted place in science at all, it will 
probably be in biology that it comes into its own. One possibility is that there is a 
distinctive mode of organicist explanation that applies to living systems. That is a 
proposal to which Richard Gunton and Francis Gilbert are sympathetic in their 
article in this set. 
 
There are more significant philosophical sources of organismal biology 
than of either holistic or systems biology. As Michael Ruse (2010) indicates, 
German Romanticism was one important influence. A. N. Whitehead was 
another, with his proposal that entities should be regarded as structures of 
activity. The concept of fields has been important in organicist biology. In at least 
some versions there is an ontological proposal that the universe (or at least the 
living world) consists of fields rather than entities, and that causal explanations 
are to be framed in terms of the action of fields. The transition from the 
metaphysics of early modern science, which required all theories to be 
corpuscularian in form, to one that allowed field theories as well, was a major 
transition point in the metaphysics of science (Harré, 1972). 
 
Organicism in biology also tends to frame explanations in terms of 
developmental pathways. Indeed, developmental biology has long taken a more 
organismal approach than most other areas of biology. An early influence in this 
line of theorizing was Paul Weiss in his Principles of Development (Weiss, 1939). 
In similar vein, C. H. Waddington (who coined the term epigenetics) developed 
the concept of a chreode for the developmental pathway that an organism 
follows as it develops, as it is canalized towards certain necessary endpoints 
(Waddington, 1975). 
 
The approach to evolution that Simon Conway Morris (2005) has 
developed around the phenomenon of convergence seems to be a rather similar 
idea, applying to evolution an equivalent of what Waddington called chreodes. 
For Conway Morris there seems to be something that has canalized evolution 
along certain pathways (convergences) and towards certain end goals (self-
aware humans). For a philosophical discussion of the use Conway Morris makes 
of convergence, see Ruse (2008). 
 
The problem is about how chreodes actually work, and how canalization 
actually arises. Neither Waddington nor Conway Morris has much to say about 
that, though Waddington’s general metaphor is of a 3D landscape where the 
genes are symbolized by pegs and the epigenetic dimension is represented by 
cables or ropes that are attached to the pegs and hold the ravines/valleys and 
peaks forming the canals/chreodes. However, that leaves open the question of 
whether there could be a mechanistic answer to that question, or whether it 
necessarily requires a non-mechanistic answer. The general assumption in this 
special issue is that there is no reason why a mechanistic answer should not be 
sought. The alternative is to take the vitalist route, perhaps to invoke what 
Driesch (1908) called entelechy, some non-physical causal factor. 
 
Conway Morris often seems ready to consider something akin to 
supernatural entelechy to explain evolutionary convergence. We do not rule that 
out, but it is the task of empirical scientists to seek the natural explanations. We 
also suggest that an explanation of chreodes or canalization in terms of 
mechanism should not necessarily be seen as an alternative to explanation in 
terms of entelechy, or some other non-physical causal factor, but rather as an 
account from a different perspective of the same underlying process. 
 
The apparent choice between mechanistic and non-physical explanations 
of developmental and evolutionary pathways may be unnecessarily stark. Field 
theories provide an alternative non-corpuscularian way of theorizing, and one 
that is sometimes more helpful and appropriate. There is usually scope for 
mutual translation between mechanistic and field theories. As Wolfhart 
Pannenberg (1993) has pointed out, field theories can be coordinated more 
easily with theological interpretations in terms of spirit. That is not to say that 
fields and spirit are identical or equivalent, just that there it is easier to co-
ordinate them. 
 
Systems Biology 
 
Systems biology, some have claimed, builds on holistic assumptions but extends 
them by using general systems theory and mathematical modeling. A significant 
precursor of modern systems biology was the development of General System 
Theory by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy . Another key early influence was 
Alan Turing’s work on The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis (Turing, 1952). 
Specific quantitative models of biological systems then began to develop, an 
early example being Denis Noble’s computer model of the heart pacemaker, and 
Noble has remained one of the most significant proponents of systems biology 
(Noble, 2006). 
 
The claim that systems biology is holistic is often made in the literature, 
though it is harder to know is exactly what is meant by that claim, as systems 
biology is not obviously holistic in the sense meant by Smuts. Though few 
practising biologists have subscribed to holism in the sense that Smuts meant it, 
the concept of holism in a rather general sense has been quite widely accepted 
within systems biology. Systems biology is often contrasted with molecular 
biology, which has been castigated by many systems biologists as being too 
narrow and reductionist; systems biology has also been hailed as a paradigm 
shift in biology (Markum, 2009).  
 
Not everyone is convinced by the claim that systems biology is holistic 
(see Gatherer, 2010). Some object that systems biology is not actually as holistic 
as it should be (Cornish-Bowden, 2006). Others see no need for systems biology 
to depart from standard reductionism. As Gatherer puts it, systems biologists are 
“holists by declaration rather than practice” (9). At present it seems that systems 
biology holds out the promise of becoming holistic, but this very much depends 
on which particular sense of holism one has in mind. Systems biology might be 
more hospitable to some kinds of holism than to other senses of the term, more 
broadly construed.  
 
There is a need for clearer proposals about what would be involved in 
systems biology becoming more genuinely holistic. One possible approach that 
probably deserves more attention than it has received is Robert Rosen’s 
Relational Biology (Rosen, 1991). He proposed that biology is about relations 
rather than things; this is akin to the more general shift in thinking that we 
mentioned above from corpuscles to the fields that connect and influence them. 
Rosen also inverted the usual hierarchy of the sciences, claiming that biology, 
with its focus on complexity, is the lowest level in the layer model, and that 
physics is a special case. 
 
A particular issue raised by a systems approach to biology is the 
relationship between structure and function. Which determines which? 
Structure may underpin and constrain functioning but, equally, sustained 
patterns of functioning may influence structures. In as far as there is plasticity of 
structures, a pattern of functioning may lead to changes in structure which in 
turn creates new functional possibilities. There has recently been much interest 
in the plasticity of the nervous system in this connection. Some systems 
approaches to biology, and it is worth noting that there are many forms, would 
probably suggest that influences go in both ways.  
 
The strong emphasis on mathematical modeling in systems biology 
means that it does not really make much use of either the machine or the 
organism metaphors, the dominant metaphors of Western science (Ruse, 2010). 
In that sense it seems to rise above the debate, but there is a real question about 
how much mathematical modeling has the verisimilitude to help us to really 
understand how biological processes work. The key issue is perhaps what the 
relationship is between the whole and the parts, and systems biology does not 
consistently grapple with that key question. Indeed, some forms of systems 
biology, particularly the so-called omics approach, look all too much like an 
intensified form of mechanism simply rewritten at the system scale rather than 
at the molecular scale. Other metaphors are possible, and the network metaphor 
suggested by Gregersen in this special issue also, in a different way, rises above 
the debate between mechanism and organicism. 
 
The term systems biology actually seems to cover a range of rather 
different approaches. In particular, it seems to include two very different things. 
One is holistic only in the sense that it tries to include measurement of all 
relevant variables in order to make better predictions; such biology may aspire 
to comprehensiveness, but is not holistic in any philosophically interesting way, 
and does not have its main focus on mechanisms. There is another kind of 
systems biology, which pays close attention to the ways in which systems (often 
quite small-scale systems) work, and how the various component processes 
interact in a feedback-rich way; such biology often moves beyond simple 
bottom-up reductionism because it is very aware of top-down and whole-part 
processes. 
 
The nature of systems biology is explored more fully by Harris Wiseman 
in this special issue, where he identifies four key features: a set of empirical 
methodologies that lead away from some of the greedy forms of reductionism 
mentioned above; an integrative, multi-scientific ethos; a reliance on data-
aggregation and computational analytics (in its dominating “bioinformatics” 
form at least); and a focus on predictive assessments for producing translational 
advances in numerous fields, such as medicine and agronomics. Systems biology 
is also consistent with the DICI approach (developmental, integrative, 
complementary, interactionist) set out by Denis Alexander in his 2012 Gifford 
Lectures. 
 
Summary 
 
There are strong resemblances between holistic, organismal and systems 
approaches to biology, though also significant differences. We have suggested 
that holistic and organismal approaches differ more in their conceptual 
background than in which kinds of biology are being referred to. Though it is 
claimed that systems biology is more holistic (perhaps more by commentators 
on the field rather than by the practising biologists themselves), there is a 
significant ongoing debate about how holistic it is, or should be. However, for the 
most part, each of these modes of biology, in their different ways, avoids the 
problems identified in the previous section of simplistic mono-causal 
determinism, equally simplistic uni-directional reductionism and biological 
mechanisms that are specified in over-mechanical ways. 
 
Applications to Specific Fields of Biology 
 
In this section we consider the implications of the more holistic approach we 
have discussed above for specific areas of biology. There is no single branch of 
biology that is holistic biology, nor should there be. Holism in biology is an 
approach that takes into account the effects of the whole organism and the 
environmental context in every field of biology. It would be a large enterprise to 
consider the full range of implications of a holistic approach for every field of 
biology, and we do not attempt that in this article. However, in this special issue 
four varied topics are considered that together raise a range of issues: 
evolutionary theory and the modern synthesis (David Depew and Bruce Weber), 
genetics and epigenetics (Ilya Gadjev), neuroscience (Harris Wiseman) and 
ecology (Richard Gunton and Francis Gilbert).  
 
Evolutionary Theory: The Modern Synthesis 
 
The modern synthesis emerged in the 1940s and 1950s as a bringing together of 
genetics and natural selection, with an emphasis on natural selection as the 
creative driving force of evolution, with cumulative effects that went far beyond 
just deciding whether or not individual mutations should be retained. The 
modern synthesis evolved a good deal itself in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and the question Depew and Weber tackle is whether it can continue to 
absorb challenges (as it absorbed challenges such as punctuated equilibria) or 
whether the challenges it currently faces require a more radical solution. 
 
Depew and Weber focus particularly on challenges from developmental 
biology, which has always been more organismic than most fields of biology. A 
key question is whether evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) can be 
assimilated into the modern synthesis, or whether it calls for some new kind of 
synthesis. Depew and Weber argue that the modern synthesis can absorb the 
perspective of organismal development; given the track record of the history of 
the modern synthesis, that seems a reasonable claim.  
 
However, the Darwinism that is emerging is not a narrow or strict one in 
which everything can be reduced to mutation and natural selection; it is one in 
which a more complex set of causal factors is operating than was envisaged 
when the modern synthesis was first formulated. There are several points that 
are worth making clear about this broadening of the modern synthesis. In as far 
as there are legitimate theological concerns about Darwinism, we suggest that 
they do not relate to all forms of Darwinism, but only to those forms that want to 
reduce absolutely everything in evolution, in a simplistic way, to random 
mutation and natural selection. It is also important here to be clear that we are 
not proposing causal factors of a non-scientific kind, but a broadening of the 
range of scientific factors that can be considered within evolutionary theory. It is 
an expansion of the modern synthesis, not a departure from it. 
 
The modern synthesis has become increasingly emancipated in the range 
of factors that it is willing to assimilate, and has already moved on to the kind of 
broad Darwinism that is less likely to raise concerns about an overly simplistic 
kinds of evolutionary reductionism. S. J. Gould was one key figure in this 
development, something on which Conway Morris agreed with him, despite their 
disagreements about the role of pure chance (Morris, 1998). Conway Morris’ 
focus on evolutionary convergence can probably also be assimilated into the 
modern synthesis, rather than requiring it to be abandoned (Morris, 2005; Ruse, 
2008). 
 
It is also worth making clear that this is not a case of science being 
distorted by religious concerns. Darwinism has become broader because 
scientific considerations have pushed it in that direction. However, fortuitously, 
developments that have been driven by science have also made Darwinism more 
congenial theologically. In this sense, a happy convergence is emerging between 
scientific and religious approaches to evolution. 
 
Genetics and Epigenetics 
 
One of the most serious challenges to have emerged recently to simple forms of 
reductionism in biology is epigenetics, something considered in this special issue 
by Ilya Gadjev. There is now abundant evidence that genes do not have 
inexorable consequences for organisms regardless of circumstances. On the 
contrary, numerous genes can be switched on or off in response to 
environmental conditions. So, for an effective response to a changing 
environment, it is not necessary to wait for genetic mutation, since the selection 
of which genes are currently operating can be modified more immediately. What 
emerges is an interactionism between genes and environment, rather than either 
genetic determinism or environmental determinism.  
 
As Gadjev points out, this is not a radical change to how geneticists 
understand things; interactionism is nothing new. However, it does have 
important implications for the public understanding of biology where simplistic 
genetic determinism is rife, though it is sometimes now replaced by a rhetoric 
that suggests an equally simplistic environmental determinism. Sometimes 
biologists who understand the complexity of biological processes perfectly well 
can lend support to misleading and simplistic popularizations. The challenge 
facing the public understanding of biology is how to popularize a complex multi-
factorial interactionism rather than reducing everything to either genes or 
environment. The challenge here is to win the argument for complexity against 
the allure of simplistic forms of reductionism or determinism. Once again, good 
science is pointing in a direction that is congenial theologically, not against it. 
 
Predictive Neuroscience 
 
Wiseman examines how systems biology echoes recent trends in predictive 
neuroscience, which are themselves modules of a larger project of data-
integration and analytics across all of the sciences. Wiseman explores some of 
the pitfalls and advantages of these trends. There is now growing interest in P4 
medicine (predictive, preventive, personalized, and participatory) which 
explicitly recognizes the complexity and contextuality of the phenomena 
concerned, integrating multiple factors that contribute to causal predictions. The 
challenge of making passably accurate predictions about the future of brain and 
behavior makes it necessary to abandon simple forms of mono-causal 
determinism and uni-directional reductionism. Nevertheless, such a change in 
mind-set can help persons rethink their health and sickness in broader, less 
mono-reductive terms (the problematic sense that every human ailment has a 
single specific and locatable biological cause). Equally, there are potentially 
worrying new forms of reductionism that arise when treating persons as 
systemic aggregates of data. Indeed, Wiseman raises questions about whether 
the conceptual revolution in predictive neuroscience is as radical as it needs to 
be; sometimes it seems to consist just of aggregating data across more systems, 
without an adequate recognition of the need for multi-directional causality. 
 
Neuroscience has long been a rather reductive area of biology, and 
protests against that have been relatively rare (but see Rose, 2005), despite 
scientific data supporting a more contextual approach to brain function. The 
tendency to see the brain as determinative of behavior is now being balanced by 
an emphasis on the effect of context on how the brain itself functions. The 
structure of the brain itself depends on how it is used, as is illustrated by the 
well-known research showing how the demands on spatial processing of 
learning to be a taxi driver in London affects the structure of the brain (Maguire 
et al., 2006). There is also a growing emphasis on the effect of context on 
cognition, with a recognition of the importance of the 4 Es, i.e. that cognition is 
enacted, embodied, embedded, and extended. All such effects are, of course, 
mediated through the physical brain. This emphasis on the contextuality of 
cognition is quite congenial theologically (e.g. Watts, 2013), and is closely 
parallel to the points that are being made by epigenetics about the contextuality 
of genetics. 
 
Ecology 
 
It might be imagined that ecology is an area of biology that always takes 
contextual and environmental factors into account. However, as Gunton and 
Gilbert point out, ecology can proceed at several different levels of analysis, and 
some levels of analysis are more contextual than others. In particular, Gunton 
and Gilbert distinguish at least four different paradigms in contemporary 
ecology: population, macroecology, trait and ecosystem ecologies. It is in the last 
that particular prominence is given to environmental causes and effects are 
especially prominent, with a focus on the ecosystem as a whole rather than just 
interactions between specific organisms. This is where scientific ecology 
becomes most closely associated with what are popularly known as ecological 
values or ecosystem services. 
 
Gunton and Gilbert also advance the philosophical view that in every 
domain of science something that can properly be called laws can be found, and 
that there are ecological laws that are not reducible to laws in other domains. 
This approach allows for a complex form of determinism, but one that has no 
aspiration of carrying through a program of inter-theoretic reductionism. Gunton 
and Gilbert follow the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, which emerges from 
the Reformational tradition, and which sets out a complex ontology in which 
there are multiple domains, each with its own laws, and no one reducible to 
another. Dooyeweerd’s approach allows an interesting form of determinism 
without reductionism. 
 
Other Applications 
 Other implications of a more holistic biology for public policy are explored by 
Reiss and Ruse (in preparation). For example, an exclusive focus on the effects of 
medicinal and surgical interventions can sometimes lead to a neglect of the 
equally powerful effects of environment conditions on medical prognoses. A 
holistic approach to biology lends support to the whole-person tradition of 
medicine. A holistic perspective is also relevant to genetic engineering. Without 
disputing the potential benefits of genetic engineering, enthusiasm for them has 
sometimes failed to consider adequately the effects of environmental context on 
the effects of genes, and has also neglected the sensibilities of consumers (an 
instance of the importance of social context).  
 
Reiss and Ruse (in preparation) also draw attention to the problems of 
integrating genetic and physiological factors on the one hand, and social, cultural 
and environmental factors on the other. Nature-nurture debates are frequently 
polarized into an either/or form, when what is required is a recognition of the 
complexity of the interactions that occur, and that how each factor operates is 
dependent on other factors. Some of the issues this applies to are quite sensitive, 
and a worry about being excoriated or a concern for political correctness has 
made it harder to develop a fully contextualised holistic approach to such varied 
questions as the effects of general intelligence on cognitive performance, and the 
effects of race on athletic performance. 
 
Theological Implications 
 
Finally we explore how holistic biology might be fruitful for theology, something 
considered by Niels Gregersen in the final article in this special issue. To 
anticipate we suggest that there are at least three implications. First, holistic 
biology steers away from the crude and simplistic reductionism and 
determinism that has been the point of greatest tension between biology and 
theology. That has been the main theme of this article, and the theological 
threads can be gathered together with much more ado. Second, holistic biology 
suggests a more subtle view of divine action in which God’s purposes are carried 
forward through engagement with the complex systems of creation rather than 
by discrete interventions. That is the principal focus of Niels Gregersen’s article, 
and it will suffice here to introduce his fuller treatment of it. Third, holistic 
biology invites us to connect the inter-dependence that is increasingly evident in 
nature with the inter-dependence that is assumed to be central to the nature and 
purposes of God. That will call for rather more unpacking. 
 
Implications for Ontology and Divine Action 
 
Why do reductionism and determinism raise theological issues? There are two 
potential concerns. One focuses on the ontological conclusions that might be 
drawn on the basis of strong reductionism. The concern is that if (and it is a big 
if) it can shown that humans and other creatures are fully explicable in terms of 
low-level physical processes, then it can reasonably be claimed that the higher-
level features that are of particular religious interest (i.e. moral, relational and 
spiritual capacities and sensibilities, or soul qualities) are nothing but the 
product of genes, neurons or other some other basic part of the human body.  
 
These would be unwelcome conclusions for most religious people, as for 
many humanists. Against such views there is a wish to assert the reality and 
significance of the higher properties of humans and other creatures. In fact, 
people have perhaps been over-fearful of strong forms of reductionism, as there 
are many philosophical problems with drawing strong reductionist conclusions. 
For example, as already indicated, the strongest forms of reductionism trade on 
the belief that complete biological explanations will be forthcoming for all higher 
human qualities, and that is likely seldom the case, if ever, to be the case. Also, as 
we have already pointed out, the project of inter-theoretic reductionism has 
been widely abandoned in biology, and largely faded away in the 1970s.  
 
However, it is not our purpose here to re-tread this well-worn 
philosophical territory but to add the scientific point that has been the major 
focus of this article, that the holistic direction in which biology is moving, which 
has increasingly been driven to recognize the importance of context, and the 
influence that wholes have on parts, undercuts this reductionism program, and 
stops it before it can make any headway. 
 
The other religious concerns are about causal influences, both human 
action and divine action and, strictly, these concerns arise more from 
determinism than from reductionism. If it can established (and again it is a big if) 
that humans and other creatures are completely determined by low-level 
biological processes, then there seems to be no room left in the universe for 
intentional action of any kind, either human or divine. If the biological 
mechanisms that enable humans and other creatures to function are purely 
mechanistic, some might be tempted to conclude that humans really are just 
mechanical, and have no freedom or capacity for purpose, beyond that of any 
gene-based organism. 
 
There are, of course, various ways of trying to avoid that uncomfortable 
conclusion. One is the compatibilist view that languages about determinism and 
free action can be run in parallel, with no conflict. However, even if it is allowed 
that there are two such epistemological perspectives, it seems that a high price 
needs to be paid, in terms of admitting that they are not referring to the same 
real world, for the two discourses to avoid running into conflict with each other. 
 
There are particular issues that arise for divine action, and various ways 
of trying to reconcile it with a scientific worldview (Saunders, 2002). One 
approach is the Thomist device of saying that God is a first cause, and that is so 
radically different from the discourse about secondary causes, with which 
scientific determinism is concerned, that no conflict arises. It is also possible that 
a Calvinist or conservative Reformed theological position can live with scientific 
determinism more easily than can most theologies. As James Moore (1981) has 
pointed out, Calvinists are able to live with natural selection much more easily 
than those of other theological persuasions, and the theological determinism of 
Calvinists, formulated in terms of predestination, enables them to go in a 
different direction from most theologians when it comes to issues about action 
and determinism.  
 Our concern here is with the implications for these issues of fully 
recognizing the systemic complexity of biological processes, and that is the focus 
of Gregersen’s article in this special issue. Gregersen is concerned with factors 
that lead to extending or supplementing the modern evolutionary synthesis. He 
concurs with Depew and Weber that there is nothing that makes such an 
extension impossible, though he thinks that the extensions called for are 
significant. One driver for this is the evolutionary trend towards increased self-
organisation (see Gregersen, 2006). Another is the way in which organisms and 
groups interface with their environment, for example in the phenomenon of 
niche construction, creating habitats that influence future evolutionary trends.  
 
This has implications, Gregersen maintains, for how we should 
understand biological explanation, which he suggests should be seen neither as a 
matter of timeless laws, nor in terms of genetic or any other kind of 
reductionism. He suggests rather that we should think of a network of 
overlapping biological explanations, serving different explanatory purposes. The 
suggestion is that holistic biology leads us, not just to a different kind of 
biological explanation, but to a new structure of biological explanations in which 
different kinds of explanation co-exist in an explanatory network.  
 
In this context, Gregersen raises the question of whether explanations in 
terms of the presence and purposes of God could have a place within such a 
network of explanations. This is akin to, but develops further, Peacocke’s 
formulation of divine action in terms of whole-part constraint. Gregersen is 
careful to distance himself from the view that God is literally the whole to which 
the parts of creation, so-called, relate. Rather he draws an analogy, suggesting 
that the causal influence of wholes to parts provides a helpful analogy for how 
God influences creation. 
 
It is widely thought that holism is more religion-friendly than 
reductionism and mechanism. However, as Michael Ruse points out in this 
special issue, things can go in the other direction. We suggest that it depends 
partly on whether a particular religious person is more alarmed by the specter of 
pantheism or of atheism. If pantheism is the main fear, holism will appear too 
dangerous to be regarded as a friend. If atheism is the main fear, holism may 
seem a useful ally. Which fear predominates depends on general theological 
outlook, perhaps with conservatives tending to be more concerned about 
pantheism, and liberals about atheism. It also depends on historical period, with 
the early modern period being more anxious about pantheism, and the late 
modern period being more concerned about atheism. 
 
Interdependence 
 
Finally, we will consider the theological significance of the interdependence in 
the natural world that is emerging from recent holistic trends in biology. Again, it 
is important to emphasize that there is no wish to allow a religious perspective 
to distort what arises from science. The theme of interdependence is something 
that emerges from biology itself as Kriti Sharma argues (Sharma, 2015), though a 
religious lens may provide a sensitizing perspective that focuses interest on the 
significance of interdependence.  
 
Sharma accepts that there has already been widespread acceptance of 
interactionism, but wants to press beyond that to the more radically organicist 
view that she calls interdependence. She thinks there is a good deal of 
misunderstanding about this, and that what many biologists have in mind when 
they talk about interdependence is really just a set of independent objects 
influencing each other by mutual interaction. Her more radical view, as she 
summarizes it in her final chapter, is that there are no “referents independent of 
terms”, no “objects independent of perception”, no “essences within things”, no 
“causal powers between regularities”, no “subjects independent of experience 
and actions”, no “laws independent of concepts and cognitive consonances”, and 
no “gaps between subjects and reality independent of the experience of such” 
(99). This is a radically revisionist ontology. 
 
Interestingly, the area of biology that Sharma chooses as the core of her 
scientific argument is from microbiology. She focuses down in chapter 3 on 
signal transduction, giving a full and detailed history of how and why our current 
views about signal transduction evolved, and came to prominence in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Her point is that how you formulate the responsiveness of cells (i.e. 
their “reactivity, activity, irritability, dynamism, behavior” etc.) depends on your 
basic conceptual assumptions. It is a compelling example of how metaphysical 
assumptions influence scientific theorizing.  
 
Sharma argues that the standard way of talking about signal transduction 
depends on some contingent, unnecessary and undefended assumptions about 
what is a cell, and what is inside and outside it. She suggests that we have slipped 
into a way of thinking about the cell as like an animal-agent, a way of thinking 
that she maintains is misleading, and which she wants to see replaced by a more 
radical ontology of interdependence. The problem is analogous to the common-
sense assumption that the physical world is composed of particles of hard 
matter, an assumption that physics has been forced to abandon. Similarly, she 
wants to see biology abandon the idea that the living world is composed of 
discrete entities called cells. 
 
Sharma has a Buddhist perspective on interdependence, but 
interdependence can also be approached from Christian and other religious 
perspectives. Stephen Verney (1976), in a Christian theological reflection on the 
evolutionary context of current human challenges, suggests that achieving a 
sense of interdependence is the evolutionary leap that humanity now needs to 
achieve, taking humanity beyond the present alternatives of, on the one hand, 
excessive individualism that leads to a breakdown of social cohesion and, on the 
other, the subjugation to authority on which totalitarian regimes are based.  
 
Once one starts looking at reality through the sensitizing perspective of 
interdependence, one can discern something analogous to the perichoresis of the 
Trinity in the living world of cells, plants and animals (as the new more holistic 
biology is making clear). You might also argue that humanity is being challenged 
to achieve a degree of social interdependence that parallels the interdependence 
manifest elsewhere in the living world. Interdependence would thus become 
central to a theology of creation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The issues about holistic biologies are complex, as will be apparent by now. 
Scientific data are requiring a return to some more holistic form of biology than 
was prevalent in the early heyday of molecular biology. However, there are many 
different forms that might take, and it is not yet clear which will, or should, 
predominate. Whichever it is, it will probably provide a counter-balance to the 
more unwelcome forms of mono-causal determinism, uni-directional 
reductionism and over-mechanistic mechanisms. At the same time, the 
complexities are such that this needs examining carefully in one area of biology 
after another, and this set of articles includes a detailed consideration of four 
sample areas of biology. There also seem to be potentially rich implications of 
the more holistic biology for various areas of theology, such as how we 
understand God’s presence in the world, and what God reveals of God’s character 
and purposes through nature. 
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